Good news from Iraq:

The Iraqi Parliament passed a bill on Saturday that would allow some former officials from Saddam Hussein’s party to fill government positions but would impose a strict ban on others. The legislation is the first of the major so-called political benchmark measures to pass after months of American pressure for progress.

According to the Times article, the law may or may not do much for various reasons. But leaving that aside, it shouldn’t be forgotten that de-Baathification was a key U.S. policy implemented by Paul Bremer’s CPA in May of 2003. Though President Bush nonchalantly claimed to not have supported this policy, it boggles the mind that (a) it took this damned long to force through, and (b) that this reversal of U.S. policy was set as some sort of a policy benchmark itself.

The story of Iraq is an intricate self-referential nightmare from which we just can’t wake up.

The New Republic really screwed up by losing Spencer Ackerman, one of the best reporters on national security matters of our generation. It’s not just that Ackerman gets good stories and does good analysis, it’s that he can write.

Here he is at The American Prospect, on the new hare-brained scheme to export the Anbar Awakening to Pakistan:

Imagine the Bush administration’s war cabinet as a drunken gambler during a moment of sobriety-inducing panic. The fortune he thought he accumulated has proven illusory, and most of the money he brought to the casino is gone. His throat is dry and his head is pounding. The display of his cell phone shows numerous missed calls—all from his wife, who begged him not to indulge his worst habits, and now pleads with him to come home. Three facts concentrate his addled mind: he is coated in shame, he is still in the casino, and he has a few dollars more.

My only quibble with the article, substance-wise, is regarding the success or failure of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq: while it’s likely doomed to failure if we envision Iraq ending up as some sort of modern parliamentary democracy, it may set up a balance of terror between the Shiites and Sunnis where they may agree to some sort of confederal soft partition solution to the country.

I’d wager the Cheney faction in the White House is structuring just that kind of outcome. And why not? It prevents all of Iraq falling under Iran’s sway, thereby slightly ameliorating the major strategic blunder of this entire war. And given that Iraq’s federal structures are bound to be fragile, it guarantees a need for a sizable American military presence in the country well into the future, which helps balance against Iran’s newfound regional hegemony. What’s not to like?

These soldiers just graduated from basic training. Almost a third will be going to Iraq and Afghanistan. President Bush is addressing them, congratulating them, exhorting them to continue the fight. I understand the need for a good photo-op. But unless the Presidential Podium is on a rotating stage like those they had in 80’s metal videos¹, isn’t it rude to force them to look at the Presidential Posterior while he speaks?