Yes, the Bush Administration approached Kosovo’s recognition reflexively and without much forethought. But in this case, their decision seems to be paying dividends.

(Why it matters: here and here.)

Peter Feith, the European Union’s special representative to Kosovo, said in an interview this month that the European Union was determined not to allow partition to become a political reality, and would work to ensure that Kosovo remained a multiethnic country in which both groups lived side by side. The European Union is soon to take over administration of Kosovo from the United Nations.

But many senior European Union officials admit privately that if the Serbs continue to push for partition, there is little the European Union can do to prevent it.

This, then, becomes yet one more example of Serbia’s uncanny ability to game the international system. The strategy has been consistent throughout the Balkan wars: create demographic facts on the ground to match your territorial objectives and then merely wait for the world to catch up with reality.

In both Bosnia and Kosovo, the end result may very well be Serbia annexing territories with majority Serb populations, majorities it created by starting expansionist wars. The bitter irony is that the only country to have escaped this fate is Croatia, a country whose military victory over Serbian irredentism is currently on trial at the Hague.

One has to think that this obvious parallel was not lost on the Kosovars, and that they opted for this flag design as an explicit reminder to the West to not let the same thing happen to them as has befallen the wretched Cypriots. Whether symbolism is an effective means of communicating with the wretched Eurocrats remains to be seen.

The supranational, legalistic E.U. spirit is a response to the conflicts of the 20th century, when nationalism and power politics twice destroyed the continent. But Vladimir Putin’s Russia, as Ivan Krastev has noted, is driven in part by the perceived failure of “post-national politics” after the Soviet collapse. Europe’s nightmares are the 1930s; Russia’s nightmares are the 1990s. Europe sees the answer to its problems in transcending the nation-state and power. For Russians, the solution is in restoring them.

Kagan is frequently lumped in with the neoconservatives—and rightly so. But it’s important to note that his argument here boils down to a gritty realist essence. Russia is a rational actor on the world stage trying to maximize its influence in its “near-abroad”. The Europeans need to wake up to the fact that soft power is not terribly effective in such circumstances. And the Americans need to come up with a catalogue of which countries are absolutely critical to their interests and which they can afford to give up to growing Russian influence.

This young interviewee puts it best:

“I am Tadić’s opponent, but I voted for him because this election is not about him but about progress,” said Branislav Jovanović, a 22-year-old student, at a Belgrade polling station. “People are sick of isolation and wars and misery.”

Tadić’s widely-reported EU enthusiasm only stands up to scrutiny when held up against Nikolić’s retrograde nationalism and rabid Russophilia. Tadić played up his nationalist bona fides during the campaign, perhaps to sap some support from Nikolić, and it remains to be seen whether his supposed EU-love will continue in the wake of the Kosovo declaration of independence which should happen some time this week. Here’s to hoping that he opts for trying to be a transformational figure in Serbian politics.

Those unconvinced that the political situation in Serbia is as toxic as I make it out to be need only to look at the results of the first round elections. The only politician running on an unabashedly pro-Western pro-modern platform, the only candidate to publicly concede that Kosovo was a lost cause for Serbia was Čedomir Jovanovic.² He got only 5.34% of the vote.

With such an illegal decision, the EU would seriously violate the UN Charter and Resolution 1244, which would automatically mean that there is the Stabilization and Association Agreement is no longer *[sic]*. After this, only in case that the EU withdrew its decision on sending the mission would Serbia be able to discuss the Agreement once again.

That’s right, he’s threatening that he will junk the SAA agreement which the EU extended to Serbia as a measure of goodwill if the EU goes on with its Kosovo plans.

Imagine you have a petulant child. You buy the child a present in order to quiet him down. The child threatens to destroy the present if you don’t do exactly as it demands.

As parents well know, there’s no negotiating with children.

But their suggested solution, perhaps borne of desperation at circumstances, seems impractical:

The way to recruit the Serbs for this project is to give them a stake in its success. As a result of the short-sighted implementation of the Dayton Agreement, Sarajevo, which before the war had the largest concentration of Serbs outside Serbia, is today a Muslim-dominated city. It is difficult to interest the Serbs in an effective multiethnic state without a major Serb presence in Sarajevo.

Converting the capital into a truly shared “national district” and encouraging all ethnicities to resettle there would vitiate a core Serb argument against centralizing state power. It would also reaffirm the principle that a country’s capital and institutions must reflect the interests and makeup of its peoples.

The problem is that the Bosnian Serbs’ goal is not a well-functioning Bosnia. Backed by a nasty nationalist government in Belgrade, which is in turn supported by Russia, and faced with a dithering EU which seems to take every opportunity to appease Belgrade over Kosovo, the Bosnian Serbs must be starting to believe that breaking apart Bosnia is a feasible course of action.

The authors quip:

Secession from Bosnia is not realistic as it would carry substantial political, human, and financial risks for the Serbs, whose economy has just begun to prosper. It should be noted, however, that realism has not been a Balkan trait. Nor can another war for “independence” be discounted; there is growing nationalism among all elements of the Bosnian population.

Is the Bosnian Serb secessionist attitude so unrealistic, given that their leaders’ goal has been incorporation into Greater Serbia from day one, and given that they see before them the opportunities to realize these goals?

Also note that “growing nationalism among all elements” is basically shorthand for the same sort of misunderstanding of that happened during the fall of Yugoslavia. Let’s get it straight: the rise of belligerent Serbian nationalism is forcing the other groups to seek protection among their own. Whatever happens in Bosnia, it’ll be important to remember how this ubiquitous nationalism came to be. “All sides are guilty” is a pernicious meme which has in large part gotten us to where we are in the Balkans today.