Via Spencer Ackerman, I just read John Nagl and Richard Fontaine’s op-ed from two weeks ago:

As the Obama administration debates whether to stick with the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan, opponents point to that nation’s flawed presidential election as a reason why this approach cannot work… This argument is badly flawed. Electoral fraud will render our task in Afghanistan more difficult, but it does not make counterinsurgency impossible. On the contrary, a counterinsurgency approach — and not a narrowly tailored mission focused solely on killing or capturing enemies — remains the best path to success in Afghanistan.

Ackerman’s worried by their proposal to effectively bypass the central government. I’m less so. They are being a bit too optimistic about the benefits this will be bringing to the Afghan people, and they’re certainly prettying up what the surge actually achieved in Iraq. Nevertheless, it’s one step closer to accepting that the best we can probably hope to accomplish is a loose confederation of warlord fiefdoms that more-or-less has control over its territory. Setting realistic goals is the first step to some kind of positive outcome to this whole mess.

Spencer Ackerman is destined for greatness, I’m pretty sure.

The New Republic really screwed up by losing Spencer Ackerman, one of the best reporters on national security matters of our generation. It’s not just that Ackerman gets good stories and does good analysis, it’s that he can write.

Here he is at The American Prospect, on the new hare-brained scheme to export the Anbar Awakening to Pakistan:

Imagine the Bush administration’s war cabinet as a drunken gambler during a moment of sobriety-inducing panic. The fortune he thought he accumulated has proven illusory, and most of the money he brought to the casino is gone. His throat is dry and his head is pounding. The display of his cell phone shows numerous missed calls—all from his wife, who begged him not to indulge his worst habits, and now pleads with him to come home. Three facts concentrate his addled mind: he is coated in shame, he is still in the casino, and he has a few dollars more.

My only quibble with the article, substance-wise, is regarding the success or failure of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq: while it’s likely doomed to failure if we envision Iraq ending up as some sort of modern parliamentary democracy, it may set up a balance of terror between the Shiites and Sunnis where they may agree to some sort of confederal soft partition solution to the country.

I’d wager the Cheney faction in the White House is structuring just that kind of outcome. And why not? It prevents all of Iraq falling under Iran’s sway, thereby slightly ameliorating the major strategic blunder of this entire war. And given that Iraq’s federal structures are bound to be fragile, it guarantees a need for a sizable American military presence in the country well into the future, which helps balance against Iran’s newfound regional hegemony. What’s not to like?